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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor to participate in this important symposium with such an 
impressive array of scholars. The symposium grew out of an Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting program that charged the 
speakers to develop innovative litigation strategies to advance gender justice 
by holding institutional actors responsible for various forms of sex and 
gender discrimination. Too frequently, the law takes an atomized approach 
to tort and discrimination law-singling out the "bad actor," thereby losing 
sight of the institutional and structural features that prevent gender equality. 
The symposium contributors have advanced theories of liability that redress 
inequalities by targeting their institutional source. This Article takes a 
different tack by addressing the responsibility of an institutional player that 
becomes involved only after the principal wrongdoing has occurred. The 
Article argues that tort law should impose a duty in the form of litigation 
norms that apply when a liability insurance carrier conducts the defense on 
behalf of the actor being sued for wrongful conduct. 1 
The Article begins by describing the universal black-letter common law 
rule that insurance companies owe no duties to tort victims when they 
control the litigation on behalf of their insured, the alleged tortfeasor. This 
Article demonstrates the injustice of this rule by considering a scenario--
more typical than commentators are willing to acknowledge-that illustrates 
"' Dean and Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. This article was 
originally presented at the 2013 AALS Annual Meeting as part of a program sponsored by the 
Section on Women in Legal Education, entitled "Institutional Responsibility for Sex.and Gender 
Exploitation." I would like to thank Nancy Levit for inviting me to participate on this panel, my 
colleague Anne Bloom for her helpful suggestions and comments, and Chris Blau (Pacific 
McGeorge Law, 2013) for his research assistance. 
1. This Article draws heavily from two articles that develop theories of liability for insurance 
carriers that act in bad faith toward third-party claimants. See Francis J. Mootz HI, The Sounds of 
Silence: Waiting for Courts to Acknowledge that Public Policy Justifies Awarding Damages to 
Third-Party Claimants When Liability Insurers Deal with Them in Bad Faith, 2 Nev. L.J. 443 (2002) 
[hereinafter Sounds of Silence]; Frances J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable/or Bad 
Faith Litigation Tactics with the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 Conn. Ins. L.J, 467 (2003) [hereinafter 
Holding liability Insurers Accountable]. 
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how the role of insurance may interfere with those who seek to advance the 
cause of gender justice. In Part Two, the Article reviews several strategies 
for holding insurance companies liable when their litigation tactics cause 
additional injury to the tort victim, and then explains why these strategies 
( even when taken together) are insufficient to address the institutional 
structures giving rise to the injustice. The Article concludes that the 
institutional problems associated with insurance defense litigation can be 
addressed only by fashioning a new cause of action that sounds in tort. 
IL THE INJUSTICE OF THE COMMON LAW RULE THAT LIABILITY INSURERS 
OWE No DUTIES TO THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS 
A long-standing common law rule provides that a liability insurer owes 
no duties in tort or contract to a third-party claimant who has been injured by 
its insured. 2 This stands in sharp contrast to the heightened duty of good 
faith owed to its insured, a duty grounded in their contractual relationship, 
but which gives rise to tort liability in some states. 3 The logic of 
distinguishing between the insured and the third-party claimant appears 
unassailable: the insurer has contracted only with the insured, and the 
primary purpose of the contract is to defend and indemnify the insured rather 
than to confer a benefit on a person suing the insured. 4 Imposing a tort duty 
on the insurer to act in good faith toward the third-party claimant would 
create an insoluble conflict by ignoring the fact that the insurer steps into the 
shoes of the tortfeasor as the tort victim's litigation adversary.5 Thus, courts 
treat the liability insurer and the third-party claimant as opposed parties who 
may each seek to maximize their own welfare in the litigation without regard 
to the interests of the other party. 
This principle is exemplified in a case involving a third-party claimant's 
suit against a carrier for stonewalling payments in a case of clear liability 
and documented damages. The carrier delayed payment solely to take 
2. Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 448-52. 
3. See generally William T. Barker & Ronald D. Kent, Bad Faith in Liability Insurance, in 
NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW: COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE Ill (Jeffrey E. 
Thomas & Francis J. Mootz III eds., 2010). 
4. See, e.g., Francis v. Newton, 43 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) ("[11he duty of the 
insurance company to use ordinary care and good faith in the handling of a claim against its insured 
arises out of the relationship between the insurer and the insured created by the contract or policy of 
insurance, and there is no fiduciary relationship or privity of contract existing between the insurer 
and a person injured by one of its policyholders."). 
5. In the words of one court, "[a]n insurer could hardly have a fiduciary relationship both 
with the insured and a claimant because the interests of the two are often conflicting." O.K. Lumber 
Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526 (Alaska 1988). More directly stated, "[t)he 
insurer has a fiduciary duty to the insured but an adversary relationship with the victim." Long v. 
McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Iowa 1992). 
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advantage of the practical obstacles and inconveniences caused by the fact 
that the claimant resided in Maine and the accident occurred in the insured's 
home state of North Carolina. Without a hint of regret or a pang of 
conscience, the Maine Supreme Court concluded: 
That [the] defendant [insurer] may have acted in a manner which 
may have brought into play plaintiff's economic circumstances as 
pressure upon plaintiff to settle for an amount less than plaintiff 
believed his case was really worth does not constitute duress in 
legal contemplation, either to vitiate the settlement which was 
made or create an independent cause of action for damages. 6 
The law is not wholly callous to the interests of the claimant. Once a final 
judgment triggers the liability carrier's duty to indemnify the insured, most 
states provide the third-party plaintiff with the right to file a direct action 
against the insurer to recover the proceeds. 7 However, during the defense of 
the underlying tort action the liability insurer may aggressively avoid 
judgment no less than its insured. This Article contends that the common 
law rule violates clearly articulated public policy, with particularly grave 
results for those who have been victimized on the basis of subordinated 
characteristics such as gender. 
Consider an all-too-typical litigation scenario. 8 Assume that a fifteen-
year-old girl participating on a swim team is repeatedly sexually assaulted 
by her swim team coach. When the abuse comes to light, the girl sues the 
sponsoring organization, which is insured under a Commercial General 
Liability ("CGL") policy. 9 Given the nature of the allegations in the suit, 
and the wording of the CGL policy, there is no legitimate basis for the 
carrier to deny coverage.10 Given the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and 
6. Linscott v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Me. 1977). 
7. Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 449-50, n.10. 
8. For another scenario emphasizing the injustice of the common law rule, see Mootz, 
Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 444-48. 
9. Paul E.B. Glad, William T. Barker & Michael Barnes, Introduction to Liability Insurance, 
in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW: COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 16·2 
(Jeffrey E. Thomas & Francis J. Mootz Ill eds., 20 l 0): 
Most CGL policies are based on forms drafted by the Insurance Services Office, an 
industry association, though insurers are free to modify ISO forms. Under those 
policies, most litigation concerns Coverage A (for "bodily injury" or ''property 
damage"-physical injuries) or Coverage B (for "personal injury" and "advertising 
injury"-economical or intangible injuries). Coverage A requires an accidental event, 
while Coverage B does not. 
10. Generally, injury suffered through intentional actions is not deemed to be within the scope 
of coverage for an occurrence, but it is possible for an organization to protect itself against the 
intentional acts of its agents. Many CGL policies will exclude sexual misconduct, but the wording of 
the exclusion may not apply to all parties insured under the policy. See, e.g., Final Judgment & 
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pleaded in her complaint, there is no legitimate basis to contest liability and 
the existence of damages. Nevertheless, the litigation is contentious and lasts 
for more than seven years. The insurer delays the proceedings at every 
opportunity and conducts extended depositions of the victim that seek to 
exploit her emotional state by delving deeply into her personal life. The 
carrier instructs its lawyers-members of a large, national law firm with 
substantial resources at their disposal-to refuse document requests at every 
turn, suffering some sanctions as the price of wearing down the plaintiff and 
her family. The litigation extends and compounds the original injury, solely 
to enable the insurance carrier to minimize its payment to the victim. 
Ultimately, the twenty-two-year-old woman settles the case, desperate to 
bring the constant reliving of her abuse to an end. The settlement is much 
lower than might be expected, but ending the litigation in itself has become 
very valuable to her. If justice delayed is justice denied, how do we 
characterize the claimant's protracted and painful experience in this case? 
One might question whether this scenario is common in modern tort 
litigation, asking "do liability insurers really act in such a craven manner on 
anything approaching a regular basis?" Unfortunately these scenarios are all 
too familiar.11 Professor Feinman suggests that the problem of 
Order Granting Attorney's Fees, Doe v. Johnson Cnty. Park & Recreation Dist. v. Lexington Ins. Co. 
(Cir. Ct. Jackson Co. Mo. Nov. 2, 2011), Nos. 0516-CV-23636, 07-EXEC-39290, 0716-CV-24114-
01, available at http://muchnick.net/omaha/missourijudge.pdf (in an order granting attorney's fees 
the court concluded that one party was an "Additional Named Insured," and therefore was not within 
the scope of a sexual misconduct exclusion that applied only to "Additional Insureds," which is a 
different category of insureds). 
11. The scenario is an amalgam but is primarily based on litigation across the country against 
United States Swimming affiliates. See id. The description of the litigation in Doe, unfortunately, is 
not unheard of. Lexington Insurance denied coverage and refused to tender a defense for the 
defendants, who suffered a $5 million verdict. Id. The plaintiff then sought to recover the judgment 
from Lexington, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to a Kansas statute that mandates an award when 
an insurer refuses to pay without just cause. Id. After five years of litigation, the court awarded the 
verdict, less setoffs, and attorneys' fees with a 1.2 multiplier. Id. The court found that Lexington 
denied coverage, even while paying claims under the exact same policy on behalf of similarly 
situated insureds. Final Judgment & Order Granting Attorney's Fees, ml 16-18, Doe v. Johnson 
Cnty. Park & Recreation Dist. v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Cir. Ct. Jackson Co. Mo. Nov. 2, 2011), Nos. 
0516-CV-23636, 07-EXEC-39290, 0716-CV-24114-01, available at http://muchn;ck.net/omaha/ 
missourijudge.pdf. ''The Court also notes that this has been a vigorous and contentious litigation, and 
has at times crossed the line or [sic] propriety, resulting in sanctions against Lexington. In that 
instance Lexington had given false representations regarding discovery matters, including payments 
made." Id. at 1 25. "In the defense of this matter, Lexington has repeatedly misstated the terms of its 
policies to the Court, including the very language of the sexual misconduct exclusion that Lexington 
relied on to deny coverage in the underlying proceeding." Id. at 1 26. "Moreover, Special Master 
Fred Wilkins describes some of Lexington's tactics in this coverage litigation as having been 
'disingenuous in the extreme,' and has made 'arguments that no competent counsel could justify,' 
and these view were adopted by the Court . . . . In the process, the Court has determined that 
Lexington deliberately concealed evidence of the payments it made from its CGL Policies: 'The 
history of the Lexington's obstructionism with respect to documentation of payments it made from 
the wasting policies at issue in these proceedings leads inevitably to the conclusion that Lexington 
has been attempting to hide the existence of these payments from the Judgment Creditors."' Id. at 'ii 
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"intransigence" by liability earners is a growing problem in cases with 
significant exposure: 
There are a very significant number of large cases, probably an 
increasing number in the last few years, in which liability is 
relatively clear and it is also clear that the victim's damages are 
substantial, yet the insurance company refuses to make an offer to 
settle the case, makes a disproportionately low offer that it refuses 
to raise, or makes an offer only very late in the process. 12 
This phenomenon extends beyond cases with severe exposure, also 
affecting high volume lines of business such as automobile liability 
insurance, because in this setting a single insurer can save significant sums 
of moner in the aggregate by stonewalling or denying numerous legitimate 
claims. 1 It is important to understand that insurers are motivated by more 
than the simple goal of reducing the amount of the verdict. As Professor 
Feinman relates, tort reform legislation has served to limit exposure and 
therefore reduced the risk of intransigence. Insurance carriers employ 
hardball tactics to discourage the plaintiff's bar from even taking cases, 
demonstrating by intransigence that they will risk taking a big hit in a few 
cases that make it to trial in order to suppress the volume of litigation.14 
Further, insurers make money not just on underwriting but also investment, 
with the result that the "float" of delaying payment on claims can be a 
central part of their business strategy because it permits them to earn more 
investment income with little risk of increasing overall claims payouts. 15 
The allegations in a recent case brought against Allstate underscore the 
degree to which insurance carriers will advance these multiple motives 
through stonewalling tactics in individual cases. In Young v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the dismissal of the complaint, 
construing all well pleaded facts as true.16 The plaintiff, an eighty-five-year-
27. The Court concluded: "Lexington makes no effort to justify its reliance on a patently 
inapplicable sexual misconduct exclusion in deciding not to defend and indemnify its insureds .... 
The language of the exclusion Lexington relied on in denying a defense ... was neither vague nor 
ambiguous: it simply did not apply." Id. at 19. 
12. Jay M. Feinman, Incentives/or Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Rejponding 
to insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193-94 (2008) (citing 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev 'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), 
on remand, 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004)). 
13. I have analyzed the Campbell case discussed by Professor Jay Feinman (note 12) in terms 
of the incentives for auto insurers to adopt intransigent policies across a broad spectrum of cases that 
leave third party claimants without an effective remedy. See Holding Liability Insurers Accountable, 
supra note I, at 475-79. 
14. Feinman, supra note 12, at 200-02. 
15. Id. at 197-202. 
16. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666 (Haw. 2008). 
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old woman named Priscilla Young, alleged that she was rear-ended by a 
driver who fell asleep at the wheel. Young's car was destroyed, and her 
injuries were severe enough to induce depression. 17 Although Young's 
medical expenses alone exceeded $6,000, she was offered only $5,000 to 
settle, and this offer was increased by a mere $300 before trial. 18 The 
understated allegation-"Allstate was aware that Young was permanently 
injured, then eighty-five years of age, and in a very vulnerable position" 19 -
emphasizes the motives to suppress payment on this particular claim, but the 
allegations brought to light a much broader course of conduct. 
Allstate allegedly acted pursuant to a plan "to increase profits by over 
$200,000,000.00 annually by underpaying claims and denying claimants just 
and reasonable compensation" that was premised on keeping injured parties 
away from attorneys and compensating them based on a computer model 
rather than actual losses. 20 The seemingly irrational approach to Young's 
claim was merely one manifestation of a much larger scheme to increase 
profits: 
If a settlement offer were not accepted or the claimant hired an 
attorney, Allstate would fully litigate virtually every claim, 
irrespective of its insured's liability or the real physical harm and 
value of the injuries suffered by the claimant. Allstate thereby 
sought to subject claimants to unnecessary and oppressive 
litigation and expenses, or, in other words, "scorched-earth 
litigation tactics." Allstate intended to force claimants and their 
attorneys through arbitration and trial unnecessarily. For example, 
if a non-binding arbitration award were anything more than 
nominal, Allstate's practice was to appeal the award. The insurer 
employed these tactics to discourage claimants from pursuing 
injury claims. Allstate also sought to discourage attorneys from 
representing claimants by creating so much work and expense that 
they could not afford to advocate for a client with minor, moderate, 
or sometimes even serious injuries .... The manual illustrated that 
a five percent reduction in the amount paid on bodily injury claims 
would yield profits of $201,000,000.00 per year. 21 
In this light, the treatment of Young makes perfect-albeit perverse-sense. 
Young's lawyer persevered and was able to obtain a jury verdict of 
17. Id.at671. 
18. Id. at 672. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 669-70. 
21. Jd.at670. 
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$198,971 for the injuries she suffered in the automobile accident. 22 Allstate 
offered to pay $260,000 if Young would also release them of any claims 
relating to Allstate's litigation tactics, but she "rejected that offer because 
she wanted to 'expos[e] Allstate's misconduct on her claim and case to other 
members of her community. "' 23 Her zeal to hold Allstate accountable ran 
headlong into the common law baseline rule that Allstate owed no duties to 
her in the litigation against its insured. Young was unable to recover on 
theories of abuse of process, malicious defense, and breach of good faith and 
fair dealing. 24 Young's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, 
dismissed at the appellate level, was remanded for further proceedings. 25 
The Article now examines these strategies that aggrieved parties like Young 
can pursue. 
Ill. STRATEGIES FOR HOLDING LIABILITY INSURERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
BAD FAITH LITIGATION TACTICS 
There are several established causes of action that can be employed by 
third-party claimants against liability insurers, but each poses distinctive 
problems and does not fully address the institutional reality of insurance 
company intransigence. The first strategy is to hold insurance defense 
counsel responsible for the litigation tactics, but this is yet another example 
of going after a single bad actor rather than attacking the institutional 
structure that promotes the bad behavior.26 Additionally, this strategy will 
22. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 672-73 (Haw. 2008). 
23. Id. at 673. 
24. Id. at 675-79 (discussing abuse of process); Id. at 679-89 (discussing malicious defense); 
690-93 (discussing good faith). 
25. Id. at 687-89. 
26. At least one court has recognized the need to look beyond the professional obligations of 
insurance defense counsel. In Givens v. Mullikin, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a third 
party claimant states a cause of action against a liability insurer for the abuses of process committed 
by defense counsel "if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, commanded, or knowingly 
authorized by the insurer." 75 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tenn. 2002). The court rejected a formulaic 
professional ideal in which defense counsel independently provides counsel to the insured, and 
accepted the institutional reality at work in such cases: 
Consequently, although an insurer clearly lacks the right to control an attorney retained 
to defend an insured, we simply cannot ignore the practical reality that the insurer may 
seek to exercise actual control over its retained attorneys in this context. ... To be 
clear, our recognition of the control exercised by insurers in this context does not 
condone this practice, especially when it works to favor the interests of the insurer over 
that of the insured; rather, we acknowledge this aspect of the relationship only because 
it would be imprudent for this Court to hold that attorneys are independent contractors 
vis-a-vis insurers, but then to ignore the practical realities of that relationship when it 
causes injury. 
Id. at 395. 
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police only the most egregious outer bounds of behavior. Litigation is a full 
contact sport, and if we regard insurance carriers as just another party 
engaged in litigation, the awarding of sanctions against attorneys for their 
excessive behavior will be too infrequent and insubstantial to deter abuse 
directed by the insurance carrier. Even more important, if insurance carriers 
reward attorneys fot employing "mad dog defense tactics,"27 as was alleged 
in Young, 28 discovery sanctions may in fact serve as a perverse badge of 
honor for the defense attorneys striving to ensure a continuing relationship 
with the insurance carrier that hires them and pays their fees. 
Claimants have attempted to use several doctrinal strategies directly 
against the insurance carrier, but narrow interpretations of these causes of 
action leave third-party claimants wjthout an effective remedy when 
insurance carriers attempt to prey on their vulnerability. First, some 
claimants have argued that they are third-party beneficiaries of the insuring 
agreement with the insured, permitting them to enforce the terms of the 
insurance policy directly. 29 In some narrow situations, this strategy provides 
an effective vehicle for relief. For example, when the claimant qualifies as 
an unnamed insured under the policy, the claimant is able to assert bad faith 
by virtue of his or her insured status. 30 Additionally, when coverage under 
In a companion case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an insurer can be vicariously 
liable under the same standard of liability when defense counsel tortiously interferes with the 
prospective business relationships between tort victims and a third-party medical center. See Trau-
Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W. 3d 691 (Tenn. 2002). 
27. This is one of the frightening details of a systemic approach to underpaying claims that 
was revealed in the trial of Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co. See Rebecca Porter, Jury Punishes Allstate 
for "Scorched-Earth" Tactics, 37 TRIAL 70 (Dec. 2001); David Hechler, Allstate Found Liable for 
Abuse of Process, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 22, 2001, at Al 5. This same corporate strategy was employed 
by State Fann and came to light in the famous Campbell case that was decided by the Supreme 
Court because of the constitutionally "excessive" punitive damages awarded by the jury. Details of 
the reprehensible behavior by State Fann is described in the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. See 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P. 3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001 ), rev 'd, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003), on remand 98 P. 3d 409 (Utah 2004). 
28. Young alleged that Allstate attorneys were paid incentive bonuses to try cases rather than 
settle them, and their performance reviews focused on whether the attorney achieved results that 
were at or below the computer model of expected payout. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 
671 (Haw. 2008). 
29. See Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note I, at 450-51. 
30. See, e.g., Bergerud v. Progressive Cas. Ins., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1248-50 (D. Nev. 
2006) (uninsured motorist provision creates a "class of non-contracting 'insureds"' that amounts to a 
contractual relationship between the third party claimant and the insurance company; citing cases in 
other jurisdictions in support of the holding). Other jurisdictions have found that the mandatory 
nature of coverage can result in the claimant being treated as an insured. See, e.g., Ennen v. Integon 
Indem. Corp., 268 P.3d 277, 282 (Alaska 2012); Swain v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 WL 
22853415 (Del. Super. May 29, 2003) (allowing third-party claimant plaintiff to recover as a third-
party beneficiary due to Delaware's statutory requirement that all drivers carry liability coverage). 
In Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 89 P.3d409 (Colo. 2004), the court held that 
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the policy is on an automatic, no fault basis, some jurisdictions permit the 
third party claimant to enforce the policy directly.31 Thus, in Meleski v. 
Schbohm LLC, the court found that a claimant was an intended beneficiary 
of the no-fault medical payments provision of the policy, recognizing that 
the plaintiff's right to immediate payment did not give rise to the typical tort 
scenario in which insurance carriers owe no duties to third-party 
claimants. 32 
Aside from these specific exceptions, courts uniformly find that the 
insured and carrier do not intend to benefit the typical third-party tort 
claimant, at least until the point that a final judgment has been entered in 
favor of the claimant. 33 Consequently, third-party tort claimants are treated 
as strangers to the insurance contract, with courts regularly concluding that 
third-party claimants "are not intended beneficiaries of liability policies and 
are owed no direct contractual obligation by insurers. "34 This reasoning 
follows from the nature of insurance as an indemnity agreement, under 
which the insurer has no obligation to make payments to the claimant until 
such time as liabilii is established in the underlying tort action or a 
settlement is reached. 5 
an unnamed insured is accorded the same rights as a first~party claimant under a policy, and 
therefore can recover for emotional distress caused by insurer refusal to pay under the policy, even 
absent a showing of substantial property or economic loss. Id. at 417. Courts are careful to limit this 
exception only to the aspect of available insurance coverage as to which the claimant should be 
treated as an insured. See Gillette v. Estate of Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) 
("In sum, we conclude that although appellant [passenger] is an insured under the Nationwide 
policy, where she seeks liability coverage for the negligence of the named insured - her husband -
she stands in the shoes of a third-party claimant who is not owed any contractual duty by the 
insurer."). 
31. See, e.g., Ennen v. Integon Indemn. Corp., 268 P.3d 277, 286-87 (Alaska 2012) (insurer 
owed duty of good faith to injured passenger with regard to the VIM claim, but not with respect to a 
tort claim against the insured); Cain v. Griffin, 849 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 2006) (slip and fall claimant 
could assert third-party beneficiary status to enforce the no-fault medical payments provision under 
the restaurant's liability policy, but could not assert a tort claim for bad faith); Gillette v. Estate of 
Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that passenger was a third-party 
claimant as to the negligence action, but not with respect to claims under the "Medical Payments" 
and "Family Compensation" provisions). 
32. Meleski v. Schbohm LLC, 817 N.W.3d 887 (Wis. App. 2012). 
33. See, e.g., Cain v. Griffin, 849 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ind. 2006) (holding that "a third party 
beneficiary cannot sue an insurer in a tort action for the insurer's failure to deal in good faith with a 
third-party beneficiary"); Rowlands v. Phico Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1092134, at *5 (D. Del. July 27, 
2000) (citing Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Chapell v. LaRosa, 
2001 WL 58057, at *2--4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2001); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. v. Johnson, 2011 
WL 3607950, at '4-5 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 15, 2011)). 
34. Dussault ex rel. Walker-Van Buren v. AIG, 99 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
35. See, e.g., Zahn v. Canadian Indcm. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 286, 288 (Ct App. 1976). 
However, some courts have taken the baseline common law position that insurers owe no contractual 
duties to third party claimants to extremes. In Aircraft Network. LLC v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the 
corporate owner of an airplane sued Cessna after it damaged the plane during routine servicing. 2004 
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Several tort theories would also plausibly apply to protect the claimant 
from stonewalling and harsh litigation tactics designed to avoid or minimize 
payments on valid claims. Some claimants have argued that a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress is appropriate when the insurer 
harasses the claimant into abandoning the litigation. 36 Clearly, an insurer 
that commits intentional torts against the third-party claimant should not be 
shielded from liability under the general rule that the carrier owes no special 
duties to the claimant. For example, in Dussault v. American Int'/. Group, 
Inc., the court permitted the claimant to sue for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress when the carrier agreed to settle the case but then refused 
to pay the settlement amount until a motion to enforce the agreement was 
filed, emphasizing that this narrow remedy would not interfere with the 
insurance carrier's heightened relationship with its insured. 37 
However, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires 
WL 5050020 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2004) (trial order). The owner also sued Cessna's insurer, 
which allegCC.ly promised to reimburse the owner for the cost of leasing another plane for use during 
the repairs. Id. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment against the insurer for breach of a 
contract to reimburse the owner and also for fraud related to the same commitments. Id. The court 
awarded $210,517.66 in damages, plus exemplary damages of $750,000 in connection with the 
fraud. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the claims against the insurer on the merits, but it also held 
that a third party claimant has no standing to bring common law causes of action against a liability 
insurer engaged in adjusting and settling a claim for which there was admitted liability. Cessna 
Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, LLC, 200 S.W.3d 203, 208--09 (Tex. App. 2006), opinion vacated 
and replaced by 213 S.W.3d 455, 460-61 (Tex. App. 2007). The owner appealed to the Texas 
Supreme Court, but the appeal was not taken, despite an impassioned plea by the author of this 
article that there was no basis in law to find a lack of standing to assert common law claims directly 
against a liability insurer. 
It is extremely important that this Court review the erroneous decision of the Court of 
Appeals because that decision will foreclose third-party claimants from bringing suit 
against insurance carriers who intentionally harm them or who form a contract directly 
with them and then breach it. ... The decision below will have the effect of consigning 
injured parties making a claim against an insured tortfeasor to a Kafkaesque fate: they 
will be dealing with a large, sophisticated and wealthy entity that is not bound by the 
common law of contract or tort that applies to every other person and entity in the State 
of Texas .... The law governing the rights of third-party claimants has never pwported 
to insulate liability insurance carriers from any liability for intentional torts committed 
against such claimants, nor against independent contract actions that might be brought. 
Yet, this surprising and dangerous result is precisely what the decision· below 
countenances. 
Amicus Curiae Professor Francis J. Mootz Ill's Brief, Aircraft Network LLC v. Associated Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc., No. 07-0148, ii-iii (in support of petition for review) (on file with author). 
36. Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 464-66. 
37. The court reasoned: "Furthermore, we disagree with AJG's assertion that this ruling will 
place conflicting duties upon an insurer. To an insured, an insurer owes an elevated duty of good 
faith .... But to a thirdMparty claimant, an insurer owes no duty-only a responsibility to refrain 
from tortious acts. This narrow responsibility does not interfere with an insurer's various 'good 
faith' duties to an insured, such as giving equal consideration in all matters to an insured's interests 
and refraining from placing its own monetary interest above an insured's financial risk." Dussault v. 
AIG, Inc., 99 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). 
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the plaintiff claimant to prove "outrageous conduct" by the insurance carrier, 
a high standard that courts generally find cannot be met solely by pleading 
that an insurer refused to pay a valid claim. 38 hi response to the egregious 
facts alleged in Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of Hawaii held 
that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was properly 
pleaded, suggesting that this tort might play an important role in policing the 
conduct of insurance carriers: 
A plaintiff may, however, state a claim for IIED because of his or 
her relationship with the defendant. "The extreme and outrageous 
character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a 
position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or 
apparent authority over the other or power to affect his interests." 
"In this sense extreme 'bullying tactics' and other 'high pressure' 
methods of insurance adjusters seeking to force compromises or 
settlements" may satisfy the conduct element. ("Insurer's bad faith 
refusal to make payment on the policy, coupled with its deliberate 
use of 'economic coercion' (i.e., by delaying and refusing payment 
it increased plaintiff's financial distress thereby coercing her to 
compromise and settle) to force a settlement, clearly rises to the 
level of 'outrageous conduct' to a person of 'ordinary 
sensibilities."'); (noting that plaintiffs may assert an JIED claim to 
hold parties liable for engaging in "outrageous bullying tactics" 
intending "to force a settlement"); In fact, cases involving parties 
inappropriately resolving their liability disputes actually helped 
define and develop lIED .... 39 
Thus, there may be some momentum toward utilizing the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress to hold liability insurers liable for outrageous 
litigation conduct. 
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is even less likely 
to apply to insurance carriers refusing to settle claims in good faith. Courts 
regularly assume that litigation is inherently prone to result in emotional 
distress, and so they generally limit liability to situations in which a pre-
existing duty of some kind exists between the parties. Working from the 
38. Lee v. Travelers Cos., 252 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the claimant 
failed to allege with specificity acts beyond failing to pay the claim in good faith, and so the claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress must fail because there is no allegation of behavior 
that is "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of [what is] usually tolerated in a civilized community"). 
In Doctors' Co. Ins. Services v. Superior Ct., 275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 683-84 (Ct. App. 1990), the court 
found that suborning perjury might establish requisite tort liability for the carrier on a theory of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, but then held that the absolute statutory litigation 
privilege insulated the carrier from liability. See generally Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 
465; Feinman, Insurance Company Intransigence, supra note 12, at 213-19. 
39. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, at 688 (Haw. 2008) (citations omitted). 
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general common law rule that the carrier and claimant owe each other no 
duties, courts find that there is no viable claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress when the claimant alleges litigation abuse. 40 
Finally, one might assume that the tort of abuse of process would most 
closely fit the scenario of insurance company intransigence. However, courts 
traditionally have limited the tort by requiring an act additional to the 
process itself, and even modern courts that jettison this requirement erect a 
strong barrier to liability for using valid process to defend a civil action 
vigorously. 41 Courts have refused to create an analogue to malicious 
prosecution, holding that an alleged "malicious defense" of an action 
generally remains outside the scope of abuse of process.42 In Young, the 
court carefully examined the merits of the proposed tort of malicious defense 
and concluded that it would result in a chilling effect on legitimate defenses 
and would add nothing to the remedies available to claimants under rules 
and statutes governing litigation and the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 43 Two judges dissented, arguing against the notion that 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress obviated the need to 
recognize a tort of malicious defense, given the heightened elements of the 
former: 
The majority seems to suggest that, because Young has stated a 
claim of IIED for which relief can be granted, we should not 
recognize the tort of malicious defense, in light of the fact that the 
tort of IIED offers the same remedies for her injuries as the tort of 
malicious defense. Although it is clear that Young has successfully 
stated claims of both IIED and malicious defense and that both 
claims afford tort remedies ... there is no way of knowing in this 
appeal from a HRCP Rule 12(b )( 6) dismissal whether Young will 
be able to prove both claims at trial. Her chances of establishing 
liability are better with respect to her malicious defense claim than 
40. .J{rupnick v. Hartford Accident & Jndem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 54 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Messersmith v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1995). See generally 
Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 465-71. 
41. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, No. 6:09-CV-01532 2011 WL 3607950, 
*5-6 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 15, 2011); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.Jd 666, 676-78 (Haw. 2008). Fm 
a complete treatment of the tort of abuse of process in this setting, see Mootz, Holding Liability 
Insurers Accountable, supra note I. 
42. See, e.g., Bertero v. Nat'l. Gen. Corp., 118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 190-92 (1975) (en bane). There 
may be some movement away from this traditional rule. In Givens v. Muillikin, 75 S. W .3d 383 
(Tenn. 2002), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a claimant may sue a liability insurer for 
abuses of process committed by defense counsel "if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, 
commanded, or knowingly authorized by the insurer." Id. at 390. See generally Mootz, Holding 
Liability Insurers Accountable, supra note I, at 488-518; Feinman, Insurance Company 
Intransigence, supra note 12, at 219-30. 
43. Young, 198 P.3d at 679. 
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with respect to her IIED claim, because, as previously stated, the 
malicious defense claim would require proof of fewer facts than 
the IIED claim. 44 
Nevertheless, the majority refused to acknowledge the broader tort of 
malicious defense, finding it "unnecessary." 45 
Returning to the previous hypothetical scenario can sharpen the 
preceding doctrinal discussion. The scenario demonstrates why the 
traditional common law rule that insurers owe no duties to third-party 
claimants results in injustices. The young woman who has endured years of 
aggressive litigation tactics designed to prey on her vulnerability would have 
little recourse under current law. As a true third-party to the insuring 
agreement, she cannot assert contract rights under the policy until such time 
as the verdict is final and the liability of the tortfeasor has been fixed. 
Although certain inappropriate filings or discovery abuses might trigger 
sanctions during the course of the litigation, it is highly unlikely that a court 
would recognize a vigorous defense as a form of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Courts would likely conclude that by seeking a large tort 
verdict, the third-party claimant has voluntarily subjected herself to the 
harshness of litigation. Courts are even more hesitant to articulate a new tort 
of "malicious defense" for fear that it will result in endless litigation and a 
chilling effect on those haled into court to provide a vigorous defense 
against the suit. In short, the dreadful experience of litigation in this matter 
will be chalked up to the cost of seeking compensation by filing suit, and 
any harms suffered by the third-party claimant will be deemed damnum 
absque irifuria. 46 This result constitutes a major structural impediment to the 
goal of achieving gender justice. 
IV. EFFECTUATING THE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOR OF PROMPT AND FAIR 
SETTLEMENT BY INSURANCE CARRIERS AND AGAINST THE EXPLOITATION 
OF GENDER INEQUITIES 
The problem of insurance carrier abuse of third-party claimants can be 
addressed properly and fully only by fashioning a new theory of tort liability 
premised on the nature of the wrong. This proposal is not as radical as it 
might appear, given that there is a clearly articulated public policy that 
liability insurers deal fairly with claimants. Nearly every state has adopted a 
variation of the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act ("UCSPA"), 
44. Id. at 697 (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). 
45. Id at 686. 
46. This maxim literally means "loss without injury," but essentially means that there may be 
an actual injury that will not be recognized in law as a compensable (legal) injury. DAMNUN SINE 
INJURIA, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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which prohibits carriers from using a pretext to dispute claims, or forcing 
claimants to litigate valid claims to coerce a low settlement. 47 Insurance 
carriers are heavily regulated businesses, and courts regular]?' acknowledge 
their vital role in the functioning of the tort system. 4 There is no 
conceivable public interest in having insurers consciously underpay 
legitimate claims in order to lower the costs of insurance, and certainly not 
for the purpose ofbenefitting equity holders in the company. 
47. The Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provides, in part: 
§4. Unfair Claims Practices Defined: 
Any of the following acts by an insurer, if conunitted in violation of Section 3, 
constitutes an wifair claims practice: 
A. Knowing misrepresenting to claimants and insureds of relevant facts of policy 
provisions relating to coverages at issue; 
C. Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation 
and settlement of claims arising under its policies; 
D. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of 
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear; 
E. Compelling insureds or beneficiaries to institute suits to recover amounts due under 
its policies by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in suits 
brought by them; 
F. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; [ and] 
L. Failing in the case of claims denials or offers of compromise settlement to promptly 
provide a reasonable and accurate explanation of the basis for such actions[.] 
All but four of the states have adopted a version of this Model Act. See Mootz, Holding Liability 
Insurers Accountable, supra note I, at 481. 
48. Dissenting from an opinion denying relief to a claimant for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, a justice of the California Court of Appeals succinctly articulated the public 
policy considerations relating to liability insurance: 
It is clear, under our mandatory financial liability laws, as well as under California's 
Insurance Code, that insurers exist and are allowed to do business in California not 
only to provide their insureds with financial peace of mind, but to provide persons 
injured by their insureds with financial recompense for their injuries in a reasonable 
and good-faith manner. 
[P)ublic policy mandates that insurance companies undertake the burden of fairly and 
timely settling those claims as alleged here, when the insured's liability is reasonably 
clear and the claimant's' damages are reasonably ascertainable and which they have 
contracted to cover, for a price, rather than allowing such costs and expenses 
encompassed by the claimed damages to fall on the shoulders of the injured claimants, 
and, in some cases, on the doctors and hospitals whose bills will go unpaid, the welfare 
systems to whom the injured parties may be forced to tum, and ultimately on the 
taxpaying public. 
Krupnick v. Hartford Accident. & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 85 (Ct. App. 1994) (Timlin, J., 
dissenting). 
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For a decade, California courts solved the problem of insurer abuse of 
third-party claimants by inferring a private cause of action under the 
UCSP A. 49 However, just ten years later the court reversed itself, after a 
confusing and complex body of case law attempted to reconcile the cause of 
action with ordinary principles of statutory interpretation.50 Royal Globe 
was generally rejected by other jurisdictions, although some states continue 
to grant rights to third-party claimants under their UCSPA. 51 
49. In Royal Globe, the Supreme Court acknowledged the common law rule against third-
party rights, but held that third-party claimants could bring a private cause of action under UCSPA 
because the statutory scheme clearly was designed to protect them as well as to protect insureds. 
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Butte Cnty., 592 P.2d 329, 332-34 (Cal. 1979). 
50. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 64 (Cal. 1988); Mootz, Sounds of 
Silence, supra note 1, at 458-60. 
51. Thirty-one states have rejected the Royal Globe strategy of interpreting state unfair claims 
practices acts to provide an implied cause of action for third-party claimants. Eight states expressly 
rejected the reasoning of the Royal Globe case. See A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia law); Earth Scientists v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 619 
F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (D. Kan. 1985); Tweet v. Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Nev. 1985); 
Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 723-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Seeman v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); White v. Unigaro Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1020-
21 (Idaho 1986); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 723-25 (Ill. App. 1979); Seeman v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia law); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. 
Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 269 (Wis. 1981). New Mexico originally rejected the Royal Globe 
strategy expressly, but the Supreme Court subsequently created an exception to its 1984 Patterson 
decision with respect to mandatory automobile insurance. See Patterson v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 685 
P.2d 396, 397-98 (N.M. Ct. App. I 984) (holding that no private cause of action exists for third party 
claimants under then-current insurance statutes). After new legislation was en.acted in 1984, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the new provision to authorize a private cause of action by third-party 
claimants against insurers in auto cases, given the mandatory nature of that fonn of insurance. Hovet 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 69 (N.M. 2004). The limits of Hovel have been clarified in a later 
decision that explained that the Court has "never recognized such a general right to sue by a stranger 
to the insurance contract in the absence of such mandatory coverage." Jolley v. Associated Elec. & 
Gas Ins. Services. Ltd. (AEGIS), 237 P.3d 738, 741 (N.M. 2010). 
Thirteen states rejected the result reached in Royal Globe in the context of the 
particularities of their own statutory scheme. See Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 
675 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (D.N.D. 1987); Young v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 844, 846---47 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 234-38 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978); Pierzga v. Ohio 
Cas. Group, 504 A.2d 1200, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Strack v. Westfield Cos., 515 
N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Fanis v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018--23 
(Or. 1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 969-70 (Pa. 1981), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 (1990); Swinton v. Chubb & Son, 
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 495, 496-97 (S.C. Ct. App. !984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 
146-49 (Tex. 1994); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981); Tank v. 
State Fann Fire & Cas. Co., 686 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 
715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487,492 (Wyo. 1992). 
Two states embraced the Royal Globe approach, but in both states the courts held that a 
third-party claimant must meet the statutory requirement of proving more than a single violation in 
order to recover. See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Mont. 1983), superseded by statute, 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33R 18-242 (1987) (granting thirdRparty claimants a private cause of action but 
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The Royal Globe experience teaches that an effective check on liability 
insurance carriers requires a direct challenge to the baseline conunon law 
rule that serves to shield them from third-party claimants. Rather than 
attempting to shoehorn a cause of action into the UCSPA as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, courts should draw from the UCSPA and many other 
statutory and judicial pronouncements to articulate the public policy basis 
for creating an exception to the general conunon law rule. Rather than using 
an amalgam of existing tort and contract theories to protect against abusive 
insurer intransigence, it makes most sense to address the public policy issue 
expressly. The most direct manner for addressing the problem is to 
recognize a new tort of bad faith insurance claim settlement practices in 
violation of public policy. Recognizing this new tort would not expand the 
scope of duties, but rather would only provide a mechanism to enforce 
existing duties. 
This new tort is analogous to the development of the tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. 52 Employers are free to exercise 
wide freedom in running their businesses, but they may not use their 
economic power to undermine important public policies, as would be the 
case if an employer terminated an employee for refusing to conunit 
perjury. 53 Similarly, insurers should be permitted to litigate vigorously when 
liability or damages are unclear, but clearly articulated public policy requires 
them to promptly and fairly settle cases when there is no legitimate dispute. 
continuing the Klaudt multiple violation requirement); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 
S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. State Fann Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994). 
A district court interpreted Nevada's unfair settlement claims practices act to provide an 
implied cause of action for insureds, but this inteJpretation relied heavily on the Nevada legislature's 
decision to grant express rights to insureds in an amendment to the act subsequent to the accrual of 
the cause of action. See Crystal Bay Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 713 F. Supp. 
1371, 1376-77 (D. Nev. 1989). The Crystal Bay holding has been met with some resistance and 
another district court case distinguished the precedent. See Winnemucca Farms, Inc. v. Eckersell, 
No. 3:05-CV-385-RAM, 2010 WL 1416881, at "'1 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2010) (finding no theory of 
liability when insurer attempted to counterclaim against insured). 
Finally, Kentucky permits a cause of action by third-party claimants for violations of the 
unfair claims practices act, but it finds the source of the cause of action in another statute that 
provides for a remedy for violations of any state statute that does not foreclose a civil remedy or 
provide its own civil remedy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117~ 
18(Ky.1988). 
52. I have developed this theory in general terms. See Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note I, 
at 476-79. The following paragraphs leading to the end of this Article summarize my more general 
thesis in the context of seeking gender equity, 
53. The watershed case for the development of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy is Petermann v. Local 396, Int'/ Bhd of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959) ("The public policy of this state as reflected in the penal code ... would be seriously 
impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged [from employment] by reason of his 
refusal to commit perjury."). 
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It is important to emphasize that this does not place insurers in a bind, such 
that they owe conflicting duties to their insured and the claimant. Rather, 
liability insurers would owe consistent duties to their insured and the public 
to fairly investigate, litigate and settle claims in accordance with the 
insurance policy. 
It also bears emphasis that the public interest is not necessarily co-
extensive with the personal interests of the third-party claimant, whose 
primary interest in part may be to recover as much money as quickly as 
possible. Liability insurers act in bad faith contrary to public policy if they 
seek to avoid obligations of their insured that cannot be contested honestly 
and legitimately, with the goal of using superior bargaining power to coerce 
the third party claimant to accept an inadequate settlement rather than incur 
the time and expense to litigate to judgment. Put somewhat differently, the 
public interest is implicated when the insurer uses specious and pretextual 
arguments to avoid settlement and delay payment. The measurement of harm 
is found in the pressure on the third-party claimant to accept less than the 
claimant could reasonably expect to receive for her injuries. The public is 
injured in this case, in addition to the third-party claimant, which justifies an 
exception to the standard common law rule that a liability insurer owes no 
duties to third-party claimants. 
Public policy is particularly implicated when the original injury 
suffered by the third-party claimant occurs in the context of gender 
subjugation, because the claimant is more likely to be vulnerable to the 
intransigence of an insurance carrier. In a wide variety of settings courts and 
legislatures have acknowledged the importance of curtailing the potential for 
the judicial process to exacerbate the barriers to gender justice. 54 
54. See genera/Jy FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(I}-{2), (b)(2) (prohibiting "evidence offered to prove 
that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual 
predisposition" but allowing the court to "admit evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual behavior 
or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any 
victim" (emphasis added)). This effort to temper litigation excesses was grounded in the goal of 
achieving gender justice. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: 
Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATI-I. U. L. R.Ev. 709, 
721 (1995) (explaining that "FRE 412 is intended to be extremely broad in scope. The exclusion of 
the complainant's prior sexual behavior encompasses evidence suggesting her . use of 
contraceptives, the birth ofan illegitimate child, venereal disease, and 'activities of the mind, such as 
fantasies or dreams.' It also is intended to exclude evidence which, although not referring directly to 
sexual activities or thoughts, may have a sexual connotation for the fact-finder 'such as that relating 
to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style."' (citations omitted)). 
In criminal cases involving sexual assault, courts have protected the victim from additional 
abuse in the course of the prosecution by relaxing the traditional broad interpretation of the 
confrontation clause. The Supreme Court has held that "[a] State's interest in the physical and 
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least 
in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 
836, 853 (1990); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Coty., 457 U.S. 596, 608 
(1982) (holding that a ''trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether [exclusion of the 
press and general public during testimony] is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim"). 
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The young woman who suffered a grievous injury at the hands of a 
swim team coach should not then be subjected to the strategies of an 
insurance carrier seeking to maximize its profits by making her claim for 
justice any more emotionally costly than the inherent travails of the litigation 
process. My proposal for a new tort action would not be limited to such 
cases, but these extreme cases should provide the motivation for courts to 
restore the role of insurers within the modem tort system. At long last, courts 
should acknowledge the implications that follow from the fact that liability 
insurance carriers are highly regulated corporations permitted to exist only 
because they serve the public interest as articulated by their governing 
legislation. This acknowledgment should lead quickly to the conclusion that 
the public interest in the smooth functioning of the tort-insurance system 
should be enforced by adoption of a targeted common law doctrine akin to 
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Until such time, 
there will be too many cases where justice is denied through the strategy of 
harassment and delay. 
The public interest is especially implicated in cases in which liability 
insurer intransigence can exert even more influence, due to the claimant's 
vulnerability as a result of gender injustice. There is no excuse for subjecting 
the victims of gender injustice to a second injury at the hands of a liability 
insurance carrier. By focusing on this particular context, it should be clear 
This evidentiary rule is also applied in sex discrimination cases under Title VII. See FED. 
R. EVID. 412, Advisory Notes (1994) (stating "Rule 412 will, however, apply in a Title VII action in 
which the plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment"); Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 
2000). Cf Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006). 
It would not be a stretch to conclude that the UCSPA statutory scheme provides an implied 
exception to the ordinary norms governing civil litigation in the insurance defense context. For 
example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has long been exempted from the 
requirements of class certification under F.R.C.P. 23 in the interest of promoting its mission to serve 
the public interest. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980) (stating that 
given "the clear purpose of Title VII, the EEOC's jurisdiction over enforcement, and the remedies 
available, the EEOC need look no further than § 706 for its authority to bring suit in its own name 
for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of aggrieved individuals. Its authority to 
bring such actions is in no way dependent upon Rule 23, and the Rule has no application to a § 706 
suit"); see also Winnie Chau, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue 
and A Silver Sixpence/or Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart and Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 969, 981 (2006). 
These doctrinal developments reflect broader and deeper concerns about the ways in which 
the civil litigation can exploit and exacerbate gender injustice. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (analyzing data that show the 
negative impact of procedural rules on cases dealing with gender inequality); Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 705 (2007) (describing how summary judgment procedures perpetuate gender bias). 
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that "public policy" is not a generic and empty term. Rather, it is the 
lifeblood of justice that must be fully articulated and embraced in the 
institutional setting of the tort-insurance system if we are to make good on 
the basic premises of the civil litigation system. 
